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THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
LEON H. WALLACE*
I. The Act and Its Enforcement
The Fair Labor Standards Act' was enacted by the Con-
gress in 1938 to regulate commerce among the several states,
to correct and eventually to eliminate labor conditions detri-
mental to the maintenance of minimum standards of living
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of em-
ployees of private employers, by establishing minimum wages
and maximum hours, and by deterring "oppressive child
labor" through the prohibition of the shipment of any goods
produced in any plant where any child has been employed
within thirty days prior to the movement of such goods.
The term "commerce" is defined to mean trade, com-
merce, transportation, transmission, or communication among
the several states or from any state to any place outside
thereof.2
The Act provided for the payment of a minimum wage
of 25¢ an hour for the first year after its effective date, 300
an hour for the next six years from such date, and after the
expiration of seven years 400 an hour.3 A maximum work
week of 44 hours was provided for the first year, 42 hours
for the second year, and 40 hours after the expiration of the
second year from the effective date of the Act.4 Work done
in excess of the specified time is to be compensated at a rate
- Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1940).
2. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1940).
3. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §206 (1940).
4. 52 Stat. 1062 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1940).
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not less than one and one-half times the regular rate. The
minimum wage and maximum hour provisions apply to any
employee who is (1) engaged in commerce, or (2) engaged
in the production of goods for commerce. The manufacture
of goods by child labor was not prohibited, but its movement
from any plant in which oppressive child labor had been em-
ployed within thirty days was prohibited5 Employees ex-
empted from the Act included those employed in an execu-
tive, administrative, professional, or local retailing capacity
(as defined by the administrator), any employee engaged in
any retail or service establishment the greater part of whose
selling is in intrastate commerce, seamen, fishermen, em-
ployees of an air carrier, agricultural employees, employees
of certain newspapers other than dailies, employees of local
electric railways or bus carriers, certain switchboard opera-
tors, employees whose qualifications and maximum hours can
be established by the Interstate Commerce Commission, or
employees such as learners, apprentices and handicapped
workers, properly exempted under §14 of the Act.8 The child
labor section is not applicable to employees in agriculture
while not legally required to attend school, nor to child actors.
A Wage and Hours Division was created, in the Depart-
ment of Labor 7 which is under the direction of an Admin-
istrator. The Administrator was empowered to appoint an
industry committee for each industry (1) engaged in com-
merce or (2) in the production of goods for commerce. These
committees had an equal number of employers, employees,
and public members, one of the latter serving as chairman.
These committees have in the past recommended minimum
wages and reasonable classifications within each such industry
to the Administrator.8 The Administrator may compel the at-
tendance of witnesses and production of records at any hearing
or investigation.9
The powers of the Administrator are narrow. He has
no power to hear and decide cases, but only the power to in-
5. 52 Stat. 1067 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1940).
6. 52 Stat. 1067 (1938, 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1940). The exemption of
employees whose qualifications and maximum hours may be es-
tablished by the Interstate Commerce Commission is an exemption
from the requirements of § 207 only (maximum hours).
7. 52 Stat. 1061 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 204 (1940).
8. 52 Stat. 1062 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 205 (1940).
9. 52 Stat. 1065 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 209 (1940).
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stitute suits for injunction in the courts. The result has
been that the courts have found it necessary to determine the
obscure meaning of the language of the Act without any basis
or background of administrative experience to guide them.
Since the seven year period has expired, the wage rates speci-
fied in § 6 prevail, and the industry rates set by orders under
§ 8 have, for all ordinary purposes, terminated.
The Act is enforced by the following methods:
1. Civil actions by employees for the amount of unpaid
wages or overtime payments, with an equal amount as liqui-
dated damages, and attorney fees.10
2. Suits for injunctive relief against violation by the
Administrator.-
3. Criminal penalties where there is willful violation. 12
The child labor provisions are enforced by actions for
injunctive relief brought by the Chief of the Children's Bu-
reau in the Department of Labor,13 or by criminal penalties.':
In 1945, in 84 United States District Courts there were
435 civil cases brought in the name of the Administrator
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Of these 83% were
disposed of by consent decrees; 8.4% by trial or during trial;
2.9% on motion before trial; .7% by default judgment; and
.2% by dismissal for want of process. Except for cases in-
volving the Office of Price Administration, this represented
the highest percentage of consent decrees and the smallest
percentage of trials in any type of litigation brought in the
Federal Courts. During 1945 there were also 597 civil cases
in which employees sought recovery of wages or overtime
and damages. For comparison, in 1941, 1,706,such cases had
been brought by the Administrator and 816 by employees in
the same courts."; Both Government and private cases under
the Act have declined materially, due to several factors, most
important of which have been higher wages and better un-
derstanding and compliance with the Act.
It is important to notice the high percentage of consent
10. 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 215(b) (1940).
11. 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1940).
12. 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (1940).
13. 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1940).
14. 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 216, 215(4).
15. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts (1945) 51, 63.
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decrees. Under the Act the Administrator has no power, as
such, to compel the payment of unpaid wages or overtime, nor
to bring an action therefor. The right to do this is in the
employee; however, in an action by the Administrator where
consent decrees are entered in addition to the decree enjoin-
ing violations of the Act, there has been added in most of the
cases a stipulation in which the employer, in effect, agrees to
pay the wages due the employees. Since once the consent
judgment is entered it has exactly the same effect as a judg-
ment entered after a trial on the merits, the consent decree
has actually become a remedial device in addition to those
provided expressly by the Act, and is enforceable in contempt
proceedings.- " Many employers probably agree to such stip-
ulations in return for a stipulation that the Administrator
will not exercise his power of seeking to enjoin the shipment
of goods already manufactured contrary to the terms of the
Act.
The principal problems raised by the Act are first to de-
termine when an employee, (a) is engaged in commerce, or
(b) is engaged in the production of goods for commerce, or
(c) is exempted from the coverage of the Act, or (d) is within
the provisions of the child labor section of the Act.
The question of coverage having been determined, there
remain the problems involved in determining minimum wages
and maximum hours in such situations where in the very na-
ture of the work the hours are uncertain and irregular, or
where piecework is involved, and the application of the Act
to incentive plans and similar devices to encourage maximum
efficiency, which raise the problems of what is the "regular"
rate specified in § 7(3), and how the Act is applied to em-
ployment not based on "regular rate" per hour in the "work-
week" specified and what constitutes working time.
The constitutionality of the Act was passed on in two
cases which were decided during the October term of 1940.
The objections that the sections of the Act imposing a mini-
mum wage and maximum hours were not within the com-
merce power, and that they infringed the Tenth and Fifth
amendments of the United States Constitution were discussed
and rejected in United States v. Darby.'7 The additional
16. See Fleming v. Warshawsky, 123 F.(2d) 622 (C.CA. 7th, 1941).
17. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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question whether the Act was an unconstitutional delegation
of the legislative power of Congress was decided in the nega-
tive in Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adminisrator,18 which was
decided on the same day. In the first case there was an appeal
by the United States from the quashing of an indictment
charging a violation of § 15 (a) (1), which prohibited the ship-
ment of goods produced in a manner not sanctioned by the
Act, of § 15 (a) (2) charging violation of the provisions of
§ 6 dealing with minimum wages, and of § 15 (a) (5) charg-
ing violation in connection with the making of reports or
records. The District Court had quashed the indictment in
its entirety upon the broad grounds that the Act, which the
court interpreted as a regulation of manufacture within the
states, was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court after re-
viewing the facts alleged in the indictment (which recited
that the defendant below was engaged in the business of ac-
quiring raw materials, which he manufactured into finished
lumber, with the intent when manufactured to ship it in
interstate commerce, and that he did so ship a large part of
the lumber produced) decided that the employees involved
were producing goods for commerce. The Court observed
that were it not for the decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart9
which held that Congress was without power to exclude the
products of child labor from interstate commerce, and which
was expressly overruled, there would be little occasion for
repeating the long recognized principles of constitutional in-
terpretation as applicable to the commerce clause. In con-
sidering whether such restriction on the production of goods
for commerce was a permissible exercise of the commerce
power, it was observed by Mr. Justice Stone, writing the
Court's opinion, that, "The power of Congress under inter-
state commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce
among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate
which so affect commerce or the exercise of the power of
Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate
means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of
the granted power of Congress to regulate commerce." The
Court also upheld the requirement concerning the making of
reports and the keeping of records. In discussing the validity
of the wage and hour provisions under the Fifth Amendment,
18. 312 U.S. 126 (1941).
19. 247 U.S. 251 (1919).
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the opinion said, "Since our decision in West Coast Hotel
Company v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, it is no longer open to
question that the fixing of a minimum wage is within the
legislative power . . . " The cited case had upheld the
validity of a state minimum wage law under the Fifth Amend-
ment.
In the case of Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator,
the petitioner was questioning the validity of a minimum wage
order made by the Administrator. In an opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice Stone it was said that, "The mandate of the constitution
that all legislative powers granted 'shall be vested' in Con-
gress has never been thought to preclude Congress from re-
sorting to the aid of administrative officers or boards as fact-
finding agencies, whose findings, made in conformity to pre-
viously adopted legislative standards or definitions of con-
gressional policy, have been made prerequisite to the operation
of its statutory command."
II. The Coverage of the Act
A. Employees Engaged in Commerce
For the employee not engaged in "the production of goods
for commerce," the importance of the interpretation of the
phrase "engaged in commerce" is obvious. Prior to 1943,
no case required the Supreme Court to interpret the cover-
age of the latter phrase. In 1942, in Overnight Motor Co. v.
Missel,20 a rate clerk for an interstates motor carrier was in-
volved. The Court observed, without further comment, "It
is plain that the respondent as a transportation worker was
engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act .... .
In suceeding cases, however, the Court has not been as
assured in its application of the phrase "engaged in com-
merce." In 1943 the Supreme Court decided a case in which
the employer received goods for its customers at various ware-
houses in Florida, shipped there from outside the state. Some
of the goods were shipped directly to the customer; more were
received at the employer's warehouse. 21 The Administrator
20. 316 U.S. 572 (1942).
21. Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564 (1943). In John-
son v. Dallas Downtown Development Co., 132 F. (2d) 287 (C.C.A.
5th, 1942) the Circuit Court held that elevator operators and main-
tenance employees in a building, a substantial number of whose
tenants were engaged in commerce were not "engaged in com-
merce," or the "production of goods for commerce." The Supreme
[Vol 22
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contended that the employees involved in receiving and han-
dling the goods were engaged in commerce. The Court, how-
ever, decided that the goods were in "commerce" as defined
by the Act until delivered to the customers, (1) when the
employer secured them for the customer under a continuing
order of business, but without an express individual order,
and (2) when they were bought in accordance with an express
individual order. The Court expressly declined to hold that
every transaction of this kind, involving anticipated orders
of customers, would be sufficient to establish the continuity
in transit necessary to keep a movement of goods "in com-
merce" within the meaning of the Act.
But in a companion case, Higgins v. Carr Bros. Co.,2 2 the
employee was a shipping clerk for a Maine wholesale grocer,
and prepared orders for delivery to Maine customers. Some
of the produce prepared for delivery, however, came to the
employer from without the state. The Supreme Court upheld
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in its finding that
when the merchandise "coming from without the state was
unloaded at respondent's place of business, its interstate move-
ment was ended," and no recovery was allowed.
Court denied certiorari in 318 U.S. 790 (1943). The Circuit Court
had said, " ... we do not think that Congress intended that the
Act with respect to those who are only 'engaged in commerce'
should be stretched and strained to cover every person whose labor
is of some use or convenience, or whose labor in some fashion con-
tributes to the comfort or convenience of one who is so engaged."
Agin, in Convey v. Omaha National Bank, 140 F. (2d) 640 (C.C.A.
8th, 1943), the Circuit Court held that interpretation of coverage
under the Act must be broader for employees engaged in servicing
of a building whose tenants were engaged in the "production of
goods for commerce," than for employees so engaged where the
tenants are only "engaged in commerce." The Supreme Court
denied certriorari in 321 U.S. 781 (1944). The only question in-
volved was whether the employees were "engaged in commerce."
22. 317 U.S. 572 (1943). In its finding that the employee was not
"engaged in commerce," the Court also distinguished between the
coverage of the classifications of employees under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and the National Labor Relations Act. It was ar-
gued that the employer in this case was in competition with whole-
salem doing an interstate business, and that it could, by under-
selling, affect those businesses and their interstate activities. The
Court said "that argument would be relevant if this Act had fol-
lowed the pattern of the National Labor Relations Act (see 29
U.S.C. § 152(7), § 160 (a) and extended federal control to business
'affecting commerce.' But as we pointed out in Kirschbaum v.
Walling, 316 U.S. 517, this Act [Fair Labor Standards Act] did
not go so far, but was more narrowly confined."
19471
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In Overstreet v. North Shore Corp.23 the Court held that
employees were "engaged in commerce" who (1) raised and
lowered a bridge, (2) who maintained it, and (3) who collect-
ed tolls from users of the bridge, which was a part of a toll
road used extensively by persons and vehicles traveling in
interstate commerce, and which crossed a waterway used in
interstate commerce. The Court referred as a guide to cases
decided under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, where
there is a similar question of coverage. In the opinion of
the Court, Mr. Justice Murphy wrote, "The nature of the em-
ployer's business is not determinative, because as we have
repeatedly said, the application of the Act depends upon the
character of the employee's activities."
But in MeLeod v. Threlkeld, 2 decided four months later
than the preceding case, a divided Court held that an employee
who prepared meals and served them to maintenance-of-way
employees of an interstate railroad pursuant to a contract
between his employer and the railroad company, is not "en-
gaged in commerce" within the meaning of §§ 6 and 7 of the
Act. Mr. Justice Reed, writing the Court's opinion, pointed
out that "Congress did not intend that the regulation of hours
and wages should extend to the furthest reaches of federal
authority. The proposal to have the bill apply to employees'
'engaged in commerce in any industry affecting commerce'
was rejected in favor of the language, now in the Act, 'each
of his employees who is engaged in commerce or the produc-
tion of goods for commerce.'"
The Court's opinion also held that the employee involved
was not engaged in "the production of goods for commerce."
However, Mr. Justice Murphy, in a dissent in which Justices
Black, Douglas and Rutledge joined, contended that there was
no sound reason for making a distinction between employees
whose activities were in the field of transportation, and a rate
clerk in the office of an interstate motor carrier,2 or the
23. 318 U.S. 125 (1943). In Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel, n. 20 supra,
it was "plain" that the rate clerk for the interstate carrier was
"engaged in commerce" to all the Court except Mr. Justice Roberts,
who dissented without opinion. In the Overstreet case, the status
of the employees as "engaged in commerce," was equally plain to
all the Court, although with more rationalization required, except
to Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr .Justice Jackson, who dissented
without opinion.
24. 319 U.S. 491 (1943).
25. Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel, 816 U.S. 572 (1942).
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seller of tickets on a toll bridge over which interstate traffic
moves,28 and that if the applicable provisions were "engaged
in the production of goods for commerce," the decisions of
the Court are clear that such employees as McLeod would be
within the Act.
2 7
The minority opinion pointed out that many years before
the Court had decided that a cook employed by the railroad
company to prepare food for maintenance workers was pro-
tected by the Employers' Liability Act.28 While this case was
never expressly overruled, the Court had retreated to a nar-
rower interpretation of coverage in succeeding cases under
that Act, the later cases limiting the coverage to employment
so closely connected to interstate transportation as to be ac-
tually a part of it.
In J. F. Fitzgerald Co. v. Pedersen,29 the employees in-
volved were employed by an independent contractor who con-
tracted with an interstate carrier to repair abutments on its
bridges over which interstate trains crossed. A unanimous
Court held in an opinion by Mr. Justice Reed that these em-
ployees were "engaged in commerce" within the meaning of
the Act.
Again, in Boutell v. Walling, ° the employees were me-
chanics hired by a partnership to service trucks of an inter-
state motor carrier corporation, in which the partners were
the only stockholders. In the opinion of the Court, written
by Mr. Justice Burton, it was said, "No claim is made that
26. Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125 (1942).
27. Cf. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942); Warren-Brad-
shaw Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88 (1942), which will be discussed in
the succeeding section.
28. Philadelphia, B. & W. R.R. v. Smith, 250 U.S. 101 (1919).
29. 324 U.S 720 (1945).
30. 66 Sup. Ct. 631 (1946). A dissenting opinion by Douglas, J., in
which Frankfurter and Rutledge, JJ., joined, did not question that
the employees involved were "engaged in commerce," but dissented
on the ground that they came within the exemption under §13(b) (1)
because their hours of service could have been regulated by the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The Court's opinion drew the
fine distinction that the employees were not directly employed by
-the carrier. It is questionable whether the Court would have rec-
onized this distinction had the Interstate Commerce Commission
been endeavoring to regulate the qualifications and hours of such
employees. In Clifton v. E. C. Schroeder Co., Inc., 153 F.(2d) 385(C.C.A. 10th, 1946), cert. denied, 66 Sup. Ct. 1153 (1946) employees
engaged locally in processing stone sold for roadbed of interstate
railroad and highway were held not to be "engaged in commerce"
or "production of goods for commerce."
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these employees are not engaged in interstate commerce with-
in the meaning of § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. They
are well within the requirement that they be 'actually in or
so closely related to the movement of commerce as to be part
of it.'"
But in Borden Co. v. Borella3' the Court clearly inferred
that porters, elevator operators, and night watchmen in a
building owned by an interstate manufacturer and housing
the administrative and elective offices of the owner-employ-
er, were not "engaged in commerce" but were "engaged in
the production of goods for commerce." And in 10 East 40th
Street Building v. Callus,32 maintenance employees of an of-
fice building housing tenants at least 32.5% and probably 42%
of whom were engaged in interstate commerce, were held by
a divided Court to be engaged neither in commerce nor the
production of goods for commerce, although there was no
disagreement that such employees were not "engaged in com-
merce."
The numerous interpretations of the coverage of the
phrase "engaged in commerce," by the lower courts, must,
of course, be analyzed in accordance with the decisions of the
Supreme Court. The lower court decisions add little to any
discussion except as they state new problems of application
of the coverage of the phrase "engaged in commerce" to
varying types of employment.3 3
31. 325 U.S. 679 (1945).
32. 325 U.S. 178 (1945). The Court's opinion said, "Obviously they
are not engaged in commerce." The minority opinion did not dis-
pute this. However, Mr. Justice Murphy contended in the dissent-
ing opinion, in which he was joined by Justices Black, Reed and
Rutledge, that the employees were engaged in the "production of
goods for commerce."
See also Johnson v. Masonic Bldg. Co., 138 F.(2d) 817 (C.C.A. 5th,
1943, cert. denied, 321 U.S. 780 (1944).
33. Wilson v. Shuman, 140 F.(2d) 644 (C.C.A. 8th, 1944). (clerical
employee in radio station engaged in interstate broadcast-
ing is "engaged in commerce"); Slover v. Wathen, 140 F.(2d)
258 (C.C.A. 4th, 1944) (night watchman of pier to which
interstate barges were tied was "engaged in commerce"); Welling
v. Patton-Tulley Transp. Co., 134 F.(2d) 945 (C.C.A. 6th, 1943)
(employees engaged on dyke construction in navigable river under
contracts of their employer with United States are "engaged in
commerce"). Walling v. McCrady Const. Co., 156 F.(2d) 932
C.C.A. 3rd, 1946) (highway contractor's employees repairing roads
and bridges for State, where roads and bridges were used by in-
terstate traffic, were "engaged in commerce"). The Act applies
to work under government contract notwithstanding that it does
not apply directly to federal, state or local governmental bodies.
Clyde v. Broderick, 144 F.(2d) 348 (C.C.A. 10th, 1944). The Act
[Vol. 22
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To summarize briefly at this point, the Court has agreed
on these propositions in principle, (a) that the scope of
coverage under the phrase "engaged in commerce" is narrower
than that of the phrase "engaged in the production of goods
for commerce," and (b) that the scope of coverage under
either phrase is narrower than that of the phrase "affecting
commerce" as used in the National Labor Relations Act.
There is obviously a sharp difference of opinion among the
members of the Court concerning the scope of coverage of
"engaged in commerce." The realities of these agreements
and the extent of the differences of opinion can better be
shown after a review of the cases determining the coverage
of the phrase "engaged in the production of goods for com-
merce."
B. Employees Engaged in the Production of Goods for
Commerce
The definition given by the Congress for the word "pro-
duced" as used in the Act 34 covers the employment of any
employee who engages in "any process or occupation necessary
to the production" of goods for commerce.
This qualification, in addition to the other express con-
tent of the definition, had no legislative and judicial back-
ground and history as the term "in commerce" has had. How-
ever, it must be remembered that the Court has taken judicial
notice of the legislative history of these definitions, 35 and has
found that the scope of coverage was more narrowly confined
than that of the term "affecting commerce" as used in the
National Labor Relations Act.
After having given a general definition of the area cov-
ered by "production of goods for commerce" in United States
v. Darby,31 the Court considered the coverage of the phrase as
does not exempt from its coverage employees whose activities
relate to the movement in interstate commerce of personally owned
goods of the employer or goods moving interstate for the con-
venience of the Government of the United States. Timberlake
v. Day and Zimmerman, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 28 (S.D. Ia. 1943).
Transportation of material by the United States to munitions plant
of an independent contractor for processing and transportation of
processed munitions to war zones is "commerce" within the mean-
ing of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the coverage of the Act
is extended to the employees of such an independent contractor as
employees engaged in the production of goods for commerce.
34. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 203(j) (1940).
35. Higgins v. Carr Bros. Co., 317 U.S. 572 (1943). See n. 21 supra.
36. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
1947]
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applied to maintenance employees of the owner of a build-
ing, the tenants of which directly engaged in the production
of clothing which concededly was produced for interstate com-
merce.
In two cases considered together, A. B. Kirschbaum Co.
v. Walling, and Arsenal Building Corp. v. Walling, 7 Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter writing the Court's opinion, discussed at
length the proposition that the Congress had chosen "not to
enter areas which it might have occupied" in the Fair Labor
Standards Act. Notwithstanding the proposition which he
stated in the Court's opinion, it was held that the Act covered
maintenance employees of the buildings in which goods for
interstate commerce were produced, because such employees
were engaged in an occupation necessary to the production
of goods for commerce, and because they "had such a close
and immediate tie with the production of goods for com-
merce." This interpretation immediately leads to the ques-
tion of how far the chain of causation in production can or
will be applied. Shortly after the decision in the Kirschbaum
case, the Court denied certiorari in a case involving an em-
ployer who made cigar boxes, which were sold exclusively to
local cigar manufacturers, who distributed the cigars manu-
factured, in the boxes, in interstate commerce. The employees
of the box manufacturer were held to be engaged in an oc-
cupation necessary to the production of goods for commerce.38
37. 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
38. Enterprise Box Company v. Fleming, 125 F.(2d) 897 (C.C.A. 5th,
1942), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 704 (1942), sub. nom. Enterprise
Box Company v. Walling. By necessary implication the Court held
the same, on very similar facts, in Dize v. Maddrix, 324 U.S. 697(1945). This case was considered with Brooklyn Savings Bank v.
O'Neil and Arsenal Building Corp. v. Greenberg. Similar rulings
have been made where the goods were sold locally to another manu-
facturer, and lost their identity completely by processing before en-
tering interstate commerce. Bracey v. Luray, 138 F.(2d) 8 (C.C.A.
4th, 1943), cited with approval in D. A. Schulte Co. v. Gangi, 66
Sup. Ct. 925, 931, n. 19 (1946), where the Court observed that it
was not necessary to trace the identical goods into interstate com-
merce if there were reasonable grounds for believing that they
would eventually enter interstate commerce; Walling v. People's
Packing Co., 132 F.(2d) 236 (C.C.A. 10th, 1942), cert. denied,
318 U.S. 774 (1943); Southern Advance Bag and Paper Co. v.
U.S., 133 F.(2d) 449 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943); Walling v. Amidon,
153 F. (2d) 159 (C.C.A. 10th, 1945). It has also been held that
ice sold locally to users carrying on interstate commerce, for icing
refrigerator cars, dining cars and the like, bring the employees of
the local ice company within the scope of employment 'necessary
to the production of goods for commerce." Hamlet Ice Co. v.
Fleming, 127 F.(2d) 165 (C.C.A. 4th, 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
[Vol. 2
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Shortly thereafter, in, Warren-Bradshaw Co. v. HaU,29
the employees of an independent contractor who operated oil
drilling equipment, and, under contract with owners, and les-
sees, drilled oil wells to an agreed depth short of oil sand
stratum, were held to be engaged Wr a "process or occupation
necessary to the production" of oil for interstate commerce.
The wells were later "brought in" by other workmen. Some
of the oil and gas, either in crude form or refined, later moved
in interstate commorce.
In Walton, Administratrix v. Southern Package Corp.,40
a night watchman in a plant manufacturing veneer which was
destined for interstate commerce, was found to be engaged
in an occupation necessary for the production of goods for
commerce. Similarly, fireguards at plant of a manufacturer
of goods for interstate commerce were held to be within the
scope of the protection of employment necessary for the pro-
duction of goods for commerce,4' and the employees of a short
line railroad, located entirely in one county, but which hauled
634 (1942); Chapman v. Home Ice Company, 136 F.(2d) 353 (C.C.A.
6th, 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 761 (1943). In recent companion
cases it was held in E. C. Schroeder Co., Inc. v. Clifton, 153 F. (2d)
385 (C.C.A. 10th, 1946), cert. denied, 66 Sup. Ct. 1353 (1946),
that employees of an independent contractor quarrying and haul-
ing stone used locally for construction of a dyke to protect an
oil field producing oil that moved in interstate commerce, were
engaged in an occupation necessary for the production of goods
in commerce, but in Clifton v. E. C. Shroeder and Co., Inc., 153
F.(2d) 385 (C.C.A. 10th, 1946)), cert. denied, 66 Sup. Ct. 1351(1946), it was held that similar workmen producing and hauling
stone for the roadbed of an interstate railroad and an interstate
highway, were neither "engaged in commerce" nor in the "produc-
tion of goods for commerce." The distinction was made that the
goods produced did not go into commerce and did not contribute
to the production of any goods for commerce as the stone used in
the dyke did.
39. 317 U.S. 88 (1942), Mr. Justice Roberts in a vigorous dissent ob-
served, "It is but the application to the practical affairs of life of
a philosophic and impractical test. It is but to repeat in another
form the old story of the pebble thrown into the pool, and the the-
oretically infinite extent of the resulting waves, albeit too tiny to
be seen or felt by the exercise of one's senses. The labor of the
man who made the tools which drilled the well . . . that of him
who mined the iron of which the tools were made, are all just as
necessary to the ultimate extraction of oil, as the labor of re-
spondents. Each is an antecedent of the consequent,--the produc-
tion of goods for commerce."
40. 320 U.S. 540 (1944). A watchman at a refinery producing oil for
interstate commerce had been held engaged in an occupation neces-
sary to the production of goods for commerce in. Mid-Continent
Pipe Line Company v. Hargrave, 129 F.(2d) 655 (C.C.A. 10th,
1942).
41. Armour and Company v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944).
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a substantial amount of granite which was all shipped from
various points along the line into interstate commerce, were
held to be both "engaged in commerce" and the "production
of goods for commerce. - Employees of a water association
which maintains an irrigation system and operates electrical
pumps which cause electricity, originating outside the state,
to flow through the association's lines, are engaged in an oc-
cupation necessary for the productions of good for commerce.43
In 1945, in two cases decided on the same day, Borden
Co. v. Borella44 and 10 East 40th St. Building v. Callus, 5 the
extent of the difference in opinion of the Court concerning the
problem of the scope of application of the phrase, "necessary
to the production of goods for commerce," was clearly shown.
In the Borden Co. case, the employees involved were porters,
elevator operators and night watchmen in a building owned
by an interstate manufacturer, and more than half of which
was used for housing the administrative and executive offices
of the owner-manufacturer. The majority of the Court, while
inferring that these employees were not "engaged in com-
merce," found that they were engaged in an employment nec-
essary for "the production of goods for commerce. '4 6  The
late Chief Justice, with Mr. Justice Roberts concurring, dis-
sented vigorously.47  But in the Callus case, the majority of
the Court found that maintenance employees of a forty-eight
story building occupied by a miscellany of tenants engaged in
42. Rockton and Rion Railroad v. Walling, 146 F.(2d) 111 (C.C.A. 4th,
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 880 (1945).
43. Reynolds v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Association, 143 F.(2d)
863 (C.C.A. 9th, 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 764 (1945). See also
New Mexico Public Service Co. v. Engel, 145 F.(2d) 636 (C.C.A.
10th, 1944). Walling v. Haile Gold Mines, Inc., 136 F.(2d) 102
(C.C.A. 4th, 1943). "Goods for commerce" include gold mined for
the government and shipped to a mint in another state.
44. 325 U.S. 679 (1945).
45. 325 U.S. 578 (1945).
46. Mr. Justice Murphy. said in the opinion of the Courld in the Borden
case, "In an economic sense, production includes all activity directed
to increasing the number of scarce economic goods .... Such labor
is but an integral part of the co-ordinated productive pattern of
modern industrial organizations."
47. The late Chief Justice said in his dissenting opinion, "The services
rendered in this case would seem to be no more related and no more
necessary to the process of production than the services of the
cook who prepares the meals of the President of the company, or
the chauffeur who drives him to his office. All are too remote
from the physical process of production to be said to be in any
practical sense, a part of, or necessary' to it."
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the production of goods for commerce, to the probable extent
of 42% of the total occupancy, were not engaged in an occu-
pation necessary to the "production of goods for commerce." 41'
Mr. Justice Murphy, joined by Justices Black, Reed and Rut-
ledge, dissented strongly29 The position of the dissenting
Justices was at least consistent with their position in the
Borden Co. case. Taking the definition of Mr. Justice Mur-
phy in that case literally,50 the scope of coverage of employ-
ees necessary "for the production of goods for commerce" is
almost unlimited, and approximates, if it does not exceed, the
scope of the coverage of the phrase, "affecting commerce."
Succeeding cases indicate that the tendency of the Court
is to extend the scope more in conformity with the Kirsch-
baum case, than to restrict it as in the Callus case.
In Roland Electric Co. v. Walling51 the employees involved
were those of an independent contractor engaged in the re-
pair and reconditioning of electric motors, and in the installa-
tion and repair of wiring in industrial establishments which
were used in the production of goods for commerce. These
employees were held to be engaged in an occupation necessary
for the production of goods for commerce.
Again in Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Com-
pany,52 the employees in question were those of an independ-
ent contractor whose principal occupation was washing win-
dows in industrial plants, which were producing goods for
commerce. Mr. Justice Burton, writing the opinion of the
Court, held that these employees were within the scope of
the Act as engaged in an occupation necessary to the produc-
tion of goods for commerce.
However, in Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., Inc.5 3
48. The late Chief Justice writing a concurring opinion to that of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter stated his position thus, "The views I ex-
pressed in my dissent in Borden Co. v. Borella would, if accepted,
control the decision in this case. If those views have been rejected
by the court, I join in the Court's opinion in this case."
49. Mr. Justice Murphy pointed out that at least 32.5% and probably
42% of the occupancy was thus engaged in the production of goods
for commerce. He observed "clearly a 32.5% occupancy is so sub-
stantial as to remove any doubt that the maintenance employees
devote a large part of their time to activities necessary to the
production of goods for commerce; hence they are covered by the
Act."
50. See n. 46 supra.
51. 326 U.S. 657 (1946).
52. 325 U.S. 849 (1946).
53. 66 Sup. Ct. 511 (1946).
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the employees were those of a newspaper with one half of
one per cent. interstate circulation. The New York Court of
Appeals had affirmed a reversal by the Appellate Division
of a judgment for the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court re-
versed the New York Court. The Court, with Mr. Justice
Douglas writing the opinion, held that the employer was en-
gaged in the "production of goods for commerce," but the
Court expressly did not decide whether the particular employ-
ees involved were covered by the Act. Mr. Justice Murphy
restricted the application of the definitions which he had
given in the Jacksonville Paper Co. and Borden Co. cases and
dissented, contending that Congress by fair implication ex-
cluded commerce of small volume from the coverage of the
Act, and that the Company producing 991/2% of its products
locally is essentially and realistically a local business which
Congress "plainly excluded from this Act."
To compare the decisions defining the scope of coverage
of the two phrases in question, it is obvious that the nature
of the employer's business is not the basis for any distinction
between the cases. As Mr. Justice Murphy, writing the
Court's opinion, observed in the Overstreet case and as the
Court has frequently reiterated, "the application of the Act
depends upon the character of the employee's activities."
Congress has exercised its power over interstate com-
merce to legislate against numerous specific problems which
have arisen, which necessarily, in the light of the historical
background of the legislation, has made for apparent dif-
ferences of interpretation, as pointed out by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in the Kirschbaum case.54 Nevertheless it must
54. In that case, 316 U.S. 517 (1942), Mr. Justice Frankfurter writing
for the Court, said at pages 520 and 521, "The body of Congressional
enactments regulating commerce reveals a process of legislation
which is strictly empiric. The degree of accommodation made by
Congress from time to time in the relations between federal and
state governments has varied with the subject matter of the legis-
lation, the history behind the particular field of legislation, the
specific terms in which the new regulatory legislation has been
cast, and the procedures for its administration .... Thus while
a phase of industrial enterprise may be subject to control under
the National Labor Relations Act, a different phase of the same
enterprise may not come within the 'commerce' protected by the
Sherman Law .... Similarly, enterprise subject to federal in-
dustrial regulation may nevertheless be taxed by the States with-
out putting an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce."
Again, on page 523, he observes, "Unlike the Interstate Commerce
Act and the National Labor Relations Act and other legislation,
the Fair Labor Standards Act puts upon the courts the independ-
[Vol. 2
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be recognized that, allowing for the known purposes of reg-
ulation, rules of statutory construction have been used to ex-
plain the boundary drawn in determining whether an em-
ployee was engaged "in commerce." Unless one adopts the
absolute literal statement of Mr. Justice Murphy in the Bor-
den Co. case t5 and applies it in its broadest possible implica-
tion, (applying it to the phrase, "in commerce," as well as to
the phrase, "production of goods for commerce,") it is not
unreasonable to look to the limitations of definition of "in
commerce" which have been used and applied in other situa-
tions such as the Federal Employers' Liability Act. It was
Mr. Justice Murphy who first used the analogy of the Em-
ployers' Liability Act cases in the Overstreet case,56 but who
disagreed with the comparison when Mr. Justice Reed used
those authorities in the McLeod case.57
It may be contended that the cases cited as definitive
authority under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45
U.S.C., Section 51, et seq.) have been discredited by the 1939
amendment (53 Stat. 1404, 1939) in which the report of the
Senate Committee of the Judiciary (Report 661) expressly
said that the aim of the amendment was to clarify and broaden
the law and to eliminate the uncertainty created by the varied
decisions, which the Court now uses to define the scope of
coverage of the phrase, "engaged in commerce," under the
Fair Labor Standards Act. The 1939 amendment of the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act expressly changed the language
of that Act from "engaged in commerce" to cover any em-
ployee "whose duties ... in any way directly or closely, and
substantially affect such commerce .... " At the same time
that the Congress was considering the necessity of such an
amendment to broaden the scope of the Employers' Liability
Act, and having used, in 1935, the phrase, "affecting com-
merce," in the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C., Sec-
tion 151, et seq.), it rejected the language of the bill which
was to become the Fair Labor Standards Act, as introduced,-
ent responsibility of applying ad hoc the general terms of the
statute to an infinite variety of complicated industrial situations.
Our problem is, of course, one of drawing lines. But it is not at
all a problem in mensuration. There are not fixed points, though
lines are to be drawn."
55. See n. 46 supra.
56. See n. 23 supra.
57. See n. 24 supra.
19471
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
"engaged in commerce in any industry affecting commerce,"-
in favor of, "engaged in commerce or the production of goods
for commerce." With this background of legislative aware-
ness, the acceptance by the majority of the Court of the prior
definitions of the phrase, "engaged in commerce," and the
making of distinctions between the scope of its coverage and
that of the phrase, "engaged in the production of goods for
commerce," is reasonable. To do otherwise might reopen
questions of the scope of the phrase, "engaged in; commerce,"
as used in other statutes, where that scope has been reason-
ably well defined by the Court and acquiesced in by the Con-
gress.
However, it is apparent that there is conflict within the
Court as to the extent of the scope properly to be given the
phrase. Referring directly to the phrase, "engaged in com-
merce," Mr. Justice Murphy said in the McLeod case58 in his
dissenting opinion, "The phrase 'engaged in commerce' should
be broadly construed. In the words of one of the Act's spon-
sors, the phrase extends to 'employees who are a necessary
part of carrying on' a business operating in interstate com-
merce."'5 Again in the Jacksonville Paper Co. case8 0 Mr. Jus-
tice Murphy said, "In using the phrase, 'engaged in com-
merce,' Congress meant to extend the benefits of the Act to
employees throughout the farthest reaches of the channels
of interstate commerce." In spite of the broad statements,
it is evident from the decisions that the members of the Court
holding those views have made a distinction between the
scope of the coverage of the two phrases and have restricted
that of the phrase, "engaged in commerce." The dissent of
Mr. Justice Murphy in the Mabee case 6' indicates that he
placed some limitations upon his definitions of the scope of
coverage of the Act which definitions were taken even more
literally by other members of the court. 2 The implications
of the definitions heretofore given might be unlimited in re-
58. Id.
59. Senator Borah speaking for the Senate Conferees on the Confer-
ence Report, 83 Cong. Rec. 9170 (1938).
60. See n. 21 supra.
61. See n. 53 supra.
62. In his dissent in the Callus case, Mr. Justice Murphy quoted with
approval the definition of the term "produced" in Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945), in which the term
had been defined as including "every kind of incidental operation
preparatory to putting goods into the stream of commerce."
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spect to the scope of coverage of the phrase "the production
of goods for commerce" and could even be applied to defining
the scope of "engaged in commerce." However, the broader
the scope of coverage given to employment necessary to "the
production of goods for commerce," the less important be-
comes the problem of the scope of coverage of the phrase
"engaged in commerce." It might be contended that in the
light of the complex pattern of our labor system, employment
of every employee is necessary to the "production of goods
for commerce." In that event, the classification of employees
"engaged in commerce" would be useless, because all employ-
ees would fall within the other classification. We must then
assume either that Congress did a useless thing in creating
the coverage for those "engaged in" commerce," or that Con-
gress intended definite limitations on the classification of
those "engaged in or necessary to the production of goods
for commerce." The language used by Mr. Justice Murphy
and concurred in by his colleagues,--in some cases by a ma-
jority,-could be used as a basis for unlimited coverage. The
dissenting opinion of the late Chief Justice in the Border,
case forecast that possibility. 3
In any event, the present tendency of the Court seems
to be to restriet the scope of coverage of the phrase, "engaged
in commerce," but with a strong minority believing in at
least some extension of the coverage, although apparently not
to the extent of placing it on a parity with the increasing
scope of coverage which is being given to the phrase, "en-
gaged in the production of goods for commerce," a scope
which is approaching if not exceeding that given to the phrase
"affecting commerce," the words of the Court notwithstand-
ing.
The legislative history of the Act and its general pur-
poses are well known. In a number of opinions, the Court
has reviewed this history in detail. The difficulties of the
Court, collectively and individually, are difficulties of the
63. The late Chief Justice said, "No doubt there are philosophers
who would argue, what is implicit in the decision now rendered,
that in a complex modern society there is such interdependence of
its members that the activities of most of them are necessary to
the activities of most others. But I think that Congress did not
make that philosophy the basis of the coverage of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. It did not, by a 'house-that-Jack-built' chain of
causation bring within the sweep of the statute the ultimate causa
causarum which result in the production of goods for commerce."
194'7]
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application of the Act to the individual fact situations in
effectuating purposes which are more restricted than the
purposes of the National Labor Relations Act, when at the
same time the Court is endeavoring to give effect to the broad
policy of this remedial legislation, as it was originally con-
ceived by its sponsors.
C. Exemptions from the Act
Several cases have involved the interpretation of the ex-
emptions under § 13 of the Act. In 1943, two cases, decided
together, Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley and Richardson v.
James Gibbons Co.,64 came before the Supreme Court upon
the interpretation to be given the exemption by § 13 (b) (1)
of employees "with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce
Commission has power to establish qualifications and maxi-
mum hours .... " In the Southland case the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held this to exempt em-
ployees of private carriers from the requirements of the Fair
Labor Standards Act only after the Interstate Commerce
Commission found need to establish maximum hours for such
employers. In the Gibbons case the Fourth Circuit held that
"power" in § 13 (b) meant the existence of the power and not
its actual exercise. The Supreme Court held that these em-
ployees were exempted even though the Interstate Commerce
Commission had not seen fit to exercise its power to establish
maximum hours.
However, In Boutell v. Walling,65 the employees involved
were hired by a partnership to service trucks of a corpora-
tion in which the partners were the only stockholders. It was
conceded that the employees were engaged in interstate com-
merce. The employers claimed exemption under section
13,(b) (1). In the opinion of the Court, by Mr. Justice Burton,
these employees were held not to be exempted from the scope
of, the Fair Labor Standards Act, because they were not em-
ployees of the carrier corporation. In a dissenting opinion
by Mr. Justice Douglas, in which Justices Frankfurter and
Rutledge concurred, it was pointed out that the exemption
is not based on the exercise, but the existence of the power
of the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate, and the
dissenting Justices observed that it was questionable whether
64. 319 U.S. 44 (1943).
65. 66 Sup. Ct. 631 (1946).
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the Court would deny the right of the Interstate Commerce
Commission to exercise its power in this case. 8
In 1945, a more troublesome question was presented to
the Court in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc. w The
important question in this case involved section 13(a) (10),
which exempts from the minimum wage and overtime re-
quirements persons employed "within the area of production
(as defined by the Administrator)" in canning agricultural.
commodities for market. The Administrator's definiton of
area of production brought within the exemption employees
of canneries which obtained "all of their farm products from
within ten miles and had not more than seven employees." A
judgment of the District Court allowing recovery under the
Act was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals on the
ground that the Administrator's definition based on the num-
ber of employees was invalid, and that the cannery was ex-
empt under the remainder of the Administrator's definition.
The Supreme Court held that the Administrator's discrim-
ination between canneries having seven or less employees
and those having more, was not authorized by the Act and
remanded the case to the District Court, with directions
to retain jurisdiction until the Administrator made a valid
definition within the authority granted him by Congress.
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Rutledge, with Jus-
tices Black and Murphy concurring, said that in his opin-
ion the definition of "area of production" was valid and that
no purely geographical definition could be made which would
carry out the major legislative policies announced in the
statute. Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in this portion of
the dissent. Mr. Justice Rutledge, however, said that if the
definition was invalid, then the exemption should be inopera-
tive. It is difficult to justify this portion of the dissenting
opinion because to say that the exemption was entirely in-
operative when and because the Administrator had exceeded
his power would certainly defeat Congressional intent.
66. In Rockton and Rion R.R. v. Walling, 146 F. (2d) 111 (C.C.A. 4th,
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 880 (1946), employees of railroad lo-
cated entirely in a single county, but which carried granite to
different points along its line, from which it entered interstate
commerce, were held to be engaged both in commerce, and the
production of goods for commerce under the Fair Labor Standards
Act and not within the exemption.
67. 822 U.S. 607 (1944).
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Several cases have arisen under the exemption in § 13
(a) (2), which exempts any employee engaged in any retail
or service establishment, the greater part of whose selling or
servicing is in intrastate commerce. It was pointed out in
Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co.6 that the purpose of ex-
cluding retailers was to eliminate those retailers near state
lines making some interstate sales.
In A. B. Kirschbaurn Co. v. Walling,6' the Court rejected
the contention that building maintenance workers were en-
gaged in service, and that the buildings should be regarded
as service establishments within the exemption of § 13 (a) (2).
The Court said that selling space in a building is not the
equivalent of selling services to consumers, and in any event,
the greater part of the servicing done by the employer was
not in intrastate commerce.
In A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling7 0 employees in the cen-
tral office and warehouse from which the employer's chain
of retail grocery stores, a minority of which were in another
state, were supplied, and at which goods shipped in interstate
commerce were received, were held not to be a retail establish-
ment within the meaning of the exemption.
In Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co.,7 1 the Court
held that employees of an independent contractor, who washed
windows of industrial plants, engaged in the production of
goods for commerce, were not within the exemption of § 13
(a) (2).
In Roland Electric Co. v. Walling,72 the employees were
employed by an independent contractor locally engaged in
commercial and industrial wiring and installation of electrical
equipment in industrial plants engaged in the production of
68. 317 U.S. 564, 571, (1943).
69. 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
70. 324 U.S. 490 (1945). In the Court's opinion written by Mr. Justice
Murphy it was said, "The Fair Labor Standards Act was designed
'to extend the frontiers of social progress by insuring to all our
able-bodied working men and women a fair day's pay for a fair
day's work' . . . . To extend an exemption to other than those
plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit would be to
abuse the interpretative process and to frustrate the announced
will of the people . . . . It is quite apparent from the sparse
legislative history of § 13(a)(2) that Congress did not intend to
exempt, as a retail establishment, the warehouse and central office
of an interstate chain store system."
71. 325 U.S. 849 (1946).
72. 326 U.S. 657 (1946).
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goods for cominerce... The Court held that such employees
were not engaged in retail sales and services as contemplated
by the Act.7
3
The tendency of the Court has been to restrict the scope
of the exemptions of the Act and this tendency is reflected
in numerous cases in the lower courts in interpreting the
exemptions74 It has also been held that a newspaper publish-
ing company, whose employees would otherwise be covered
by the Act, is not exempt on the ground that the application
of the Act constitutes an abridgment of "freedom of the
press."75
D. Child Labor Provisions
As has been said before, the Act does not prohibit "op-
pressive child labor" but does prohibit the shipment in com-
merce of any goods produced in an establishment in the
United States, in or about which within thirty days prior
to the removal of such goods therefrom, any "oppressive child
labor" has been employed. The Chief of the Children's Bu-
reau in the Department of Labor is authorized to administer
73. In the opinion of the Court written by Mr. Justice Burton, it was
said, "The word 'retail' because of its ready contrast with 'whole-
sale' is generally more restrictive than the word 'service.' The two,
however, are used so closely together in this statute as to require
them to be interpreted similarly. This makes it appropriate to
restrict the broad meaning of 'service' to a meaning comparable
to that given the narrower term 'retail.' The words are put on a
like level especially by their use in the alternative with the single
word 'establishment' in the phrase, 'any retail or service estab-
lishment,' the greater part of whose selling or servicing is not
intrastate commerce (italics supplied). Accordingly in proportion,
as the meaning of the word 'retail' is restricted to sales made in
small quantities to ultimate consumers, personal rather than com-
mercial and industrial uses of those articles, so it is correspondingly
appropriate to restrict the word 'service' to services to ultimate
users of them for personal rather than commercial purposes."
74. Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F.(2d) 52 (C.C.A. 8th,
1940) (makers of pearl buttons from shells are not exempted under
§ 13(a) (5) exempting employees engaged in fishing or processing
of acquatic life); Schmidt v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank,
148 F. (2d) 294 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) (building superintendent who. per-
formed janitor's work and had few duties of supervision was not
exempt as an executive or administrative employee); Bracey v.
Luray, 138 F.(2d) 8 (C.C.A. 4th, 1943) (employees of scrap metal
dealer selling scrap metal to wholesalers are not exempt under§ 13(a) (2) as employees of a retail establishment); Murphy v.
Georgia Aero-Tech, 49 F. Supp. 982 (D.C.Ga. 1943) (employees of
private school for training air pilots are not employees of a service
establishment).
75. Sun Publishing Co. v. Walling, 140 F.(2d) 445 (C.C.A. 6th, 1944),
cert. denied, 322 U.S. 728 (1944).
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the provisions of the Act relating to oppressive child labor.
In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot,78 in a 5-4 decision,
the Court held that the employment of children within the
restricted age limits of the Act did not apply to a telegraph
company. In the majority opiniog it was conceded that tele-
grams are "goods" within the meaning of the Act, but it was
concluded that the telegraph company did not "produce" the
goods. While conceding that the definition of the word "pro-
duced" included employees who "handle," or in any other
manner "work on goods," the Court's opinion recognized a dis-
tinction between handling in transportation and producing.
The word "ship" was not defined in the Act and the Court's
opinion observed that "ship" as used in the Act does not ap-
ply to intangible messages.
In a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Murphy, in which
Justices Black, Douglas and Rutledge joined, it was pointed
out that prior to the introduction of the messages into inter-
state commerce, the telegraph company employees "worked
on" and "handled" the messages by aiding in the composition
of them, writing them on blanks, transforming them into
electrical impulses and performing numerous other incidental
tasks, and that in a very real and literal sense they handled
and worked on a message before it entered the channels of
interstate commerce. While the Court, in the majority opin-
ion, is convinced that the Act did not contemplate its appli-
cation to such a situation, the Court concedes that "it is to
indulge in a fiction to say that it (Congress) had a specific
intention on a point which never occurred to it." As pointed
out in the minority opinion, any difficulty which the Court
feared over a thirty day suspension of telegraph messages
as harmful to the public interest could have been handled
easily by a stay of the mandate, or injunction, until at least
thirty days elapsed, during which no "oppressive child labor"
had been employed by the telegraph company. When the
majority opinion conceded that telegrams were "goods" with-
in the meaning of the Act, it is difficult to follow its reason-
ing that the telegraph company was not a "producer" or
"shipper." 7
76. 323 U.S. 490 (1945).
77. In two cases considered together, Lenroot v. Kemp and Lenroot v.
Hazlehurst Mercantile Co., 153 F.(2d) 153 (C.C.A. 5th, 1946), it
was recognized that the handling of tomato packing crates by
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IIL Wages and Hours under the Act
A. Determination of Overtime
1. The "Regular Rate" at which Employee is Employed
As Mr. Justice Murphy said in writing one of the Court's
opinions, 0 "The keystone of § 7(a) is the regular rate of
compensation. On that depends the amount of overtime pay-
ments which are necessary to effectuate the statutory pur-
pose. The determination of that rate is, therefore, of prime
importance."
In Overnight Motor Transportation Company v. MisseT0
the rate clerk of an interstate motor carrier, paid on a weekly
basis, but who worked varying hours, sued for overtime pay.
No hourly rate had been fixed, but the salary was sufficient
to cover regular and overtime work as based on the minimum
hourly rate as fixed by the statute. The Court found that this
plan did not comply with the statute because the minimum
rate fixed by the statute was not necessarily the regular rate,
the regular rate being the result of dividing the total wage
by the hours which were really worked. The Court found this
construction necessary to make the Act effectual. The Court
said, "We agree that the purpose of the Act was not limited
to a scheme to raise substandard wages first by a minimum
wage and then by increased pay for overtime work .... The
provision of § 7(a) requiring this extra pay for overtime is
clear and unambiguous . . . ; by this requirement, although
overtime was not flatly prohibited, financial pressure was
applied to spread employment to avoid the extra wage ......
The Court also held that the good faith of the employer was
immaterial.80
However, on the same day the Court decided the case of
Walling v. A. H. Belo Corporation,8' in which the employer,
children employed by tomato packers whose goods entered com-
merce, constituted manufacturing and processing occupation within
the protection of the Act.
78. Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419(1945).
79. 316 U.S. 572 (1942).
80. Mr. Justice Reed delivering the opinion of the Court said, "Per-
lexing as petitioner's problem may have been, the difficulty does
not warrant shifting the burden to the em.ployee . . . . The
liquidated damages for failure to pay the mmunum wages under§1 6(a) and 7(a) are compensation, not a penalty by the govern-
ment."
81. 316 U.S. 624 (1942).
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by contract, had changed a straight weekly for varying hours
of work into an hourly wage. Under the facts the contract
base rate was in every case in excess of the statutory mini-
mum wage. In a 5-4 decision the Court upheld this contract
rate as the "regular rate." The broad statements in the two
cases are difficult of reconciliation because the plan in the
Missel case could have been legalized without difficulty under
the legal conclusions of the Belo case. As a forecast the Court
cited in the Missel case the Circuit Court opinions of Warren
Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall,82 and suggested comparison
with Carleton Screw Products Co. v. Fleming.
8 3
In the same year Warren Bradshaw Company v. Hall
came before the Court, and the Court gave but slight con-
sideration to the contention that the "regular rate" had been
complied with. The employees involved received fixed wages
per day and there was no agreement providing for an hourly
rate, or that the weekly salary included additional compensa-
tion for overtime hours. The employer urged that it had com-
plied with the overtime requirements because the employees
received wages in excess of statutory minimum wage, includ-
ing time and a half of that minimum wage for all overtime
hours. The Court observed in the majority opinion that a
similar argument had been squarely rejected in the Missel
case.
In 1944 the case of Walling v. Helmerich and Payne,
Inc.85 was decided by the Court. This case involved a so-
called "split-shift plan." The first hours of work were paid
for at a specified hourly rate which was termed the regular
rate, and the remaining hours were treated as overtime, for
which the rate was calculated as one and one half times the
designated "regular rate." Under this plan the total wages
would be the same as before the Act. The District Court and
the Circuit Court of Appeals had both held that this split-day
plan did not violate the provision of § 7 (a) of the Act under
82. 124 F.(2d) 42 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941).
83. 126 F.(2d) 537 (C.C.A. 8th, 1942). The Circuit Court of Appeals
had indicated that bonuses were subject to overtime payments under§7(a). The Supreme Court later denied certiorari on this case in
317 U.S. 634 (1942) because the application was not made in time.
The Warren-Bradshaw case was later to come before the Supreme
Court to be affirmed.
84. 317 U.S. 88 (1942).
85. 323 U.S. 37 (1944).
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the Belo case. The Supreme Court pointed out that while the
words "regular rate" were not defined, they specifically
meant the hourly rate actually paid, and that the rate fixed
here by contract as the regular rate was an artificial one,
and observed that no contract plan could be approved which
really computed the regular rate in an artificial manner which
violated the Act itself.
Shortly after, in United States v. Rosenwasser,8 the
question arose concerning whether the Act applied to piece
work and the Supreme Court held that the Act did apply, and
that a worker is as much an employee when paid by the piece,
as he is when paid by the hour.17
In Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co.88 the
employer before the Act had paid the employees, who were
lumber stackers, on a piece work basis. After the Act the
parties had contracted on a specified hourly rate which was
less than the actual hourly rate they had received on the piece
work basis in the six months period preceding the trial. It
was stipulated that if the piece work earnings under the pre-
vious plan were greater than the new wage earned under the
contract, the employees would receive those. At the same
time the Court also considered another case, Walling v. Har-
nischfeger Corporation,9 which involved employees producing
electrical products, who had entered into a collective bargain-
ing agreement whereby they were to be paid a basic hourly
rate plus an incentive bonus. Some of the jobs involved had
been "time-studied" by the management; others had not.
When a worker was assigned to a "non-incentive" job he was
paid at least 20 % more than his basic hourly rate. This plan
86. 323 U.S. 360 (1944).
87. In delivering the opinion of the Court Mr. Justice Murphy ob-
served, "The fact that §6(a) speaks of a minimum rate of pay
'an hour,' while §7(a) refers to a 'regular rate' which we have
defined to mean 'the hourly rate actually paid for the normal, non-
overtime week . . . does not preclude application of the Act to
piece workers. Congress necessarily had to create practical and
simple measuring rods to test compliance with the requirements
as to minimum wages and overtime compensation. It did so by
setting the statutes in terms of hours and hourly rates. But other
measures of work and compensation are not thereby voided or placed
outside the reach of the Act. Such other modes must merely be
translated or reduced by computation to an hourly basis for
the sole purpose of determining whether the statutory requirements
have been fulfilled."
88. 325 U.S. 419 (1945).
89. 325 U.S. 427 (1945).
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was similar to the plan in the Youngerman-Reynolds base ex-
cept that it was more nearly in accord with what the pre-
vious piece work arrangement had been. The Court held both
of these plans in violation of the Act and returned to its
definition of the regular rate in the Missel case, as determined
by dividing the actual weekly earnings by the number of
hours which had been worked during the period in question. 0
The Missel case and the Belo case were distinguished
originally on the basis that the former did not have an agreed
on "regular rate." Therefore, there was no presumption that
the regular rate was the minimum statutory rate. On the
other hand, the Belo case had an express contractual "regular
rate." However, succeeding cases make it apparent that this
is not the distinction which the Court has been making, and
that the Court has been attempting to look to the reality of
what had been the actual rate during the period in question.
Since all of these cases involve variable working hours and
varying facts, this distinction based upon a mathematical
computation of the actual working period, necessarily brings
different and varying results.
Two recent cases have raised the same problems inherent
in the cases discussed. In Walling v. Alaska Pacific Consolid-
ated Mining Company9' the employer contracted on another
split-shift plan to pay the employees six hour in each shift
on regular time and two hours overtime at a lower contrac-
tual rate. The result was that the payment for six hours
under the contractual rate and time and a half for the two
overtime hours-was the same as the previous daily wage. In
this case the Circuit Court held that the contractual rate-
was not a true "regular rate" in contemplation of the Act.
In the same Circuit Court in the case of Walling v. Halli-
90. In a dissent the late Chief Justice distinguished between these
two cases and the-Helmerich and Payne case and pointed out that
in that case no attempt was made by the employer to apply the as-
serted regular rate to the first 40 hours of work and observed, "All
this is in flat contradiction to Walling v. A.H. Belo Corporation, 316
U.S. 624, in which we held that nothing in the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act bars an employer from contracting to pay his employees
minimum hourly rates for time plus one and one-half times those
rates for overtime in excess of the minimum statutory rates with
a lump sum guarantee, which in some weeks exceeds the wage at
the stipulated hourly rate .... That case is controlling here."
91. 152 F.(2d) 812 (C.C.A. 9th, 1945), cert. denied, 66 Sup. Ct. 960(1946).
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burton Oil Well Cementing Co.,912 the employer had been pay-
ing a monthly salary for variable hours of employment. The
employer, after the passage of the Act, contracted with the
employees for a weekly wage at a rate so that the payment
for the straight time hours and time and a half for overtime
hours worked out approximately to the amount of the guar-
anteed sum. The Circuit Court of Appeals in this case held
that the contract was not sufficiently distinguishable from
that in the Belo case and held that case controlling. The Su-
preme Court has granted certiorari but has not yet given its
opinion. While the Supreme Court has not actually overruled
the Belo case, it has restricted its application to such an ex-
tent that it seems doubtful that it will be applied to any other
case whose facts are in the slightest degree different.93
While the Supreme Court, in the cases involving express
contractual rates, has purported to find what was Ithe actual
rate based upon an actual period, nevertheless it is reasonable
to suppose that in computing the "regular rate" in that way
there would be a continual variance in the regular rate as
additional facts of working time would be added to the fig-
ures from which any computation is made, and that the "reg-
ular rate" would not only vary in general, but would contin-
ually vary as to individuals.,-
92. 152 F.(2d) 622 (C.C.A. 9th, 1945), cert. granted, 66 Sup. Ct. 1021(1946).
93. Walling v. Uhman Grain Co., 151 F.(2d) 381 (C.C.A. 7th, 1945)
This was the same Court which had been reversed in the Harnisch-
feger case. The Circuit Court of Appeals observed that if the Su-
preme Court had not overruled the Belo case it had so restricted its
application that it was no authority except for an identical state
of facts. In the dissenting opinion in the Circuit Court of Appeals
in the Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. case, it was contended
that the Belo case was not reliable authority. In Asselta v. 149
Madison Avenue Corp., 156 F.(2d) 139 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1946) a con-
tract whereby employees were employed at a weekly wage for the
work week in excess of the statutory hours and for overtime at
one and one-half times the hourly rate, computed by dividing the
weekly wage by the number of hours employed plus one-half of
the hours actually employed over forty, was held invalid under the
overtime compensation provisions.
94. In Green Head Bit and Supply Co. v. Hendricks, 49 F. Supp. 698(D.C. Okla. 1943) provision was made in the contract for an
adjusted rate based upon hours worked and total earnings to be
determined each week. The District Court upheld this under the
Belo case. It might be suggested that this contract fulfills the
requirements of computation laid down by the Supreme Court in the
cases which apparently repudiate the Belo case, provided, of course,
the weekly "regulate rate" so arrived at is never less than themmnium rate fixed bn the Act.
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While the personnel of the Court has changed since the
opinion in the Belo case, it would appear that the present ten-
dency of the Court is to restrict materially its application,
and that succeeding cases have created an unsettled situation
as evidenced by the decisions of the lower courts in deciding
essentially the same problems.
2. What Constitutes Compensable Working Time.
A companion problem to determining the "regular rate" is
inevitably the problem which may arise concerning what
constitutes time for which the employee actually should be
compensated by the employer.
In Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company v. Mus-
coda Local 12395 the Court held that iron ore miners were at
work within the meaning of the Act while they were engaged
in underground travel in reaching the point where they ac-
tually started their work of mining. The Court found that
there was no real agreed-upon custom that the miners were
to be paid only from the time they reached the "working
face" of the mine, and that no bona fide collective bargain-
ing had ever been practiced by these employers, so that a
valid contention could be made that it was a custom agreed
upon by the employees that they were not to be paid until
they reached the workings.
However, the suggestion that the result in the Muscoda
Local case was based upon any real lack of custom or contract
arrived at by genuine -collective bargaining was negatived in
the case of Jewell Ridge Coal Corporation v. Local 6167, Uni-
ted Mine Workers of America.9 6 This case involved the work-
ers in coal mines and in a 5-4 decision the Court held that
miners were entitled to pay and credit for working time from
the time they entered the mine until they left, irrespective of
custom or contract.97
95. 321 U.S. 590 (1944).
96. 325 U.S.. 161 (1945).
97. In the minority opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson, in which the late
Chief Justice and Justices Roberts and Frankfurter concurred, it
was objected that the Court's decision either invalidated or ig-
nored the explicit terms of a collectively bargained agreement be-
tween the parties involved, based on a half century's custom in the
industry, and it was pointed out that in the. Senate debate on the
bill it had been expressly asserted by one of the Senators, who
at the time of this decision was a member of the Supreme Court who
had concurred in the majority opinion, that the Act would not af-
fect bargaining agreements already made, and that both employers
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In Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Potteries Co.98 a situation
which the Court considered comparable to the "portal to por-
tal" facts was considered. The employees involved were piece
workers who entered at an outside gate and changed clothes
before reporting to their working.places. Fourteen minutes
prior to the scheduled starting time the employees were per-
mitted to punch the clocks and prepare for their work, al-
though it was found that it did not take them this long to do so.
The case was heard before a Master who found that the time
spent in walking from time clocks to the places of work was
not compensable working time, in view of the established cus-
tom, and that the time consumed in preliminary duties after
arriving at the place of work was not compensable. The
Master also found that the time spent in waiting before and
after shift periods was not compensable, because the employ-
ees failed to prove that they were not free to spend such
time on their own behalf. The District Court accepted the
Master's findings and conclusions with one exception. The
Court established a formula in which all minutes over seven
as shown by the time cards in the morning and all over five
at the beginning of the afternoon were to be computed as
compensable working time. No reason was given for the two
minute differential between the morning and afternoon
"punch-ins." The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the District Court's decision for failing to accept the finding
of the Master, that productive work did not start until the
scheduled time and that the formula of the District Court
was based upon surmise. The Supreme Court reversed the
Circuit Court by placing emphasis on the fact that it was
the duty of the employer under the Act to keep the necessary
records of these variable times in which employees were pre-
paring for work, and the case was remanded for the determin-
ation of the -amount of walking time involved, and the amount
of preliminary activities performed. Although the Master
had taken voluminous evidence he had been unable to deter-
and employees had joined in a letter to the Wage and Hour Ad-
ministrator in 1940 asking that the agreements between the parties
as to the "usual working places" be respected, 'and that on July
18, 1940, in response to this, the Administrator had ruled that
working time on a "face to face basis" was not unreasonable. The
philosophy of the Court as to collective bargaining in this case
is difficult to reconcile with that which it expressed in the Belo
case.
98. 66 Sup. Ct. 1187 (1946).
1947]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
mine these facts in the first instance. This case indicates the
possibility that the Court is entering administrative areas
which it cannot handle adequately, and is dealing with prob-
lems which might be handled more satisfactorily in collective
bargaining processes, or by the increasing experience of the
Administrator, without impairing the purposes of the Act.
In two other cases which were decided on the same day,
Armour and Company v. Wantock9" and Skidmore v. Swift
and Co.,100 the employees involved were private fire guards
at the plants of manufacturers of goods for interstate com-
merce. In the first case the employer had been held liable
for overtime for time spent on the employer's premises by
fire guards, subject to call, who otherwise spent their duty
time in sleeping or recreation. The Supreme Court held that
such time was compensable time, and consequently overtime
payments and liquidated damages were involved. The Court
observed that the parties were competent to agree that an
employee could resort to amusements provided by the employ-
er without a violation of his agreement. In the second case,
the Court observed that the Administrator believed the prob-
lems presented by inactive duty required a flexible solution,
and that while the rulings, interpretations, and opinions of
the Administrator were not controlling on the Courts, they
constituted a body of experience and informed judgment to
which Courts and litigants could properly resort for guidance.
B. The Power to Contract Concerning Wages and to
Waive Rights under the Wage and Hour Provisions.
In Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.1'0 a majority of
the Supreme Court held that an agreement by "red caps"
with the employer to turn over tips which would be counted
as part of the minimum wage was binding upon them, no mat-
ter how reluctantly the employees had made the agreement.
The court's opinion reasoned that if the "red caps" were em-
ployees, the employer was entitled to receive the tips, and
if they were not employees they were not entitled to any con-
tractual wage at all. Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy
dissented.
99. 323 U.S. 126 (1944).
100. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
101. 386 U.S. 38 (1942).
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Another important question which has arisen is whether
an employee may waive his right to liquidated damages as a
right separate and apart from his right to statutory wages.
In Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil'0 2 the Court, in an opinion
by Mr. Justice Reed, held that the employee could not waive
his right to the liquidated damages, and that to permit him
to do so would defeat the purpose of the Act. The Court re-
iterated its position that in spite of the fact that many of
these cases arose without any intent on the part of the em-
ployer at the time to violate the Act, by reason of the uncer-
tain coverage of the Act, harshness of the application of the
statutory liability, enabling the employee to recover an amount
far in excess of any damage which he has in fact suffered,
cannot be considered under the express terms of the Act it-
self. The considerations involved in this argument were
brought out in a dissenting opinion by the late Chief Justice
in which Justices Roberts and Frankfurter concurred.
In D. A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi,103 the employees were
maintenance employees of a building whose tenants produced
goods delivered to local distributors and which, were by them
subsequently placed in interstate commerce. After the ruling in
the KirschbaumWO4 case, the employees claimed overtime pay
and liquidated damages. A bona fide dispute developed as
to whether the tenants were engaged in production of goods
for commerce since the goods were delivered to local distribu-
tors and producers. To avoid litigation and in consideration
of a release in full, the employer paid a sum to each employee
concededly equal to the amount of overtime due each of the
employees if he were within the coverage of the Act. Sub-
sequently, the action was brought by the employees for over-
time pay and liquidated damages. In the Court's opinion
delivered by Mr. Justice Reed, the Court declined to determine
whether the liability for unpaid wages and liquidated damages
102. 324 U.S. 697 (1945) (decided with Dize v. Maddrix and Arsenal
Building Corp. v. Greenberg). In Southern Package Corporation
v. Walton, 18 So. (2d) 458 (Miss. 1944) the Supreme Court
of Mississippi held that liquidated damages authorized under the
Fair Labor Standards Act constituted a penalty within the state
statute requiring actions for a penalty to be commenced within
one year. The Supreme Court of the United States denied cer-
tiorari in 323 U.S. 762 (1944). The position taken by the Missis-
sippi court seems untenable now in view of the language used by
the Court in Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil.
103. 66 Sup. Ct. 925 (1946).
104. 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
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created by §16(b) was divisible, but expressly held that the
remedy of liquidated damages cannot be bargained away by
bona fide settlements of disputes over coverage. It must be
noted that once the Court determines that the employee is
within the coverage of the Act, the cases presented have then
involved no dispute as to the amount of actual wages due.
No case has yet come before the Court where there has been
a release given in the case of a bona fide dispute as to the
amount of wages due when the question of coverage had al-
ready been settled. For example, if the employee contended
that he had worked longer than the records of the employer
showed and there was a good faith dispute as to the actual
amount of time worked and the consequent amount of over-
time due, the Court has not held that a settlement of such a
claim could not be made under the Act.
IV. The Powers of the Administrator and Administrative
Problems.
In Gemsco Inc. v. Walling,0 5 the question involved was the
power of the Administrator to prohibit home work in the
embroideries industry under. §8 (f) of the Act as a necessary
means of making effective a minimum wage order for that
industry. The opinion of the Court, by Mr. Justice Rutledge,
pointed out that in §8(f) Congress had provided that orders
issued under this section, "shall contain such terms and con-
ditions as the Administrator finds necessary to carry out the
purpose of such orders, to prevent the circumvention or eva-
sion thereof, and to safeguard the minimum wage rates es-
tablished therein.'! In §8 (e) it was provided that no order
issued under this section prior to the expiration of seven
years from the effective date of §6 shall remain in effect after
such expiration. The latter section obviously refers to the
procedure set up for the fixing of minimum wage rates dur-
ing the first seven years from the effective date of the Act.
The Administrator's power to issue an order such as the one
involved here, after the expiration of such seven years, must
come from §8(f). Since it is as important for the Admin-
istrator to have that enforcement power after the statutory
minimum has become fixed as it was during the years when
the minimums were being set by the Industry Committees,
105. 324 U.S. 244 (1944) (decided with Maretzo v. Walling and Giusep-
pi v. Walling).
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it is not an unreasonable construction of Congressional intent
that this power was intended to be a permanent power. In
the present case, however, the wages involved were commit-
tee wages, so the Court in upholding the action of the Ad-
ministrator did not actually answer the more important ques-
tion involved, although the Court observed that there were
possibilities for the issuance of wage orders by the Adminis-
trator after the expiration of the seven year period.1 1
In Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland0 7 the Court held that
the Administrator was not authorized under §4 (c) of the Act
to delegate to regional directors his power to sign and issue
subpoenaes. The Chief Justice pointed out that the entire
history of the legislation controlling the use of subpoenaes
indicates a Congressional purpose not to authorize by im-
plication the delegation of the subpoena power, and that there
is nothing in the history of this Act or in the Act itself from
which an intent to give the Administrator this power could be
properly inferred. In a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice
Douglas, in which Justices Black, Byrnes and Jackson joined,
it was urged that the Court was imposing technical difficulties
which would materially retard the accomplishments of the
purpose of the Act. The subsequent history of the admin-
istration of the Act offers no substantial evidence to support
this contention.
In Walling v. Reuter Co.10 8 the District Court had en-
joined violations of the Act. This had been reversed by the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. After the Supreme Court had assumed
jurisdiction by granting certiorari, a motion was filed to
recall the writ for the reason that the employer corporation
had been dissolved for the avowed purpose of securing tax
advantages, although the business was continued. It was ar-
106. In Walling v. Wolff, 65 F.Sup. 532 (E.D. N.Y. 1946), the
District Judge observed, "I cannot believe that Congress intended
any such result. I cannot think that Congress believed that after
the lapse of seven years all of the conditions which brought about
the Fair Labor Standards Act would suddenly right themselves and
administrative controls, such as prohibition of home work, would
be no longer necessary. The Act was designed to remedy abuses
of great antiquity .... Viewed in this light the difficulties about
the exact wording of the statute diminish in importance." See
also Walling v. Cimi Embroidery & Novelty Co., Inc., 65 F. Supp.
389 (S.D. N.Y. 1945) and Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.(2d) 608
(C.C.A. 2nd, 1944).
107. 815 U.S. 357 (1942).
108. 821 U.S. 671 (1944).
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gued that since under Louisiana law the life of the corpora-
tion was not prolonged, even for the purpose of continuing
pending litigation against it, the case had become moot. The
Supreme Court conceded that it could not render an; effective
judgment on the merits because of the dissolution, but ob-
served that the judgment of the District Court was entered
before dissolution and was binding on the employer and on
others who in appropriate circumstances may be brought with-
in its reach. The Supreme Court, therefore, vacated the judg-
ment of the Circuit Court and the cause was remanded to the
District Cort where the petitioner would be free to take such
proceedings for its enforcement as would be proper. Since
the employer corporation had dissolved itself, it had now
placed itself in a position that it could not contest the validity
of the District Court's judgment.
In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,09 the em-
ployer urged that in order for the Administrator to be en-
titled to the issuance of subpoenaes duces tecum to secure
records to determine the question of coverage, that question
should first be adjudicated before the subpoenaes could be en-
forced. The Circuit Court of Appeals refused to sustain this
position, and held that the Administrator was entitled to en-
forcement on a showing of probable cause. The Court, in an
opinion by Mr. Justice Rutledge, rejected both contentions,
holding that the Administrator's investigative function in
searching out violations with a view to enforcing the Act is
essentially the same as that of a grand jury, or of a Court
in issuing other pre-trial orders for the discovery of evidence.
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Murphy urged the aband-
onment of the policy that Congress could permit administra-
tive agencies to issue subpoenaes.10
V. Conclusion.
To summarize briefly, it appears that the Court has not
yet reached agreement on the extent of the coverage of the
109. 66 Sup. Ct. 494 (1946).
110. Mr. Justice Murphy observed in his dissent, "To allow a non-judicial officer, unarmed with judicial process, to demand the
books and papers of an individual is an open invitation to abuse
of that power. It is no answer that the individual may refuse to
produce the material demanded. Many persons have yielded sole-
ly because of the air of authority with which the demand is made,
a demand that cannot be enforced without subsequent judicial aid.
Many invasions of private rights thus occur without the restrain-
ing hand of the judiciary ever intervening."
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Act to employees either "engaged in commerce" or "the pro-
duction of goods for commerce"; that there is a tendency to
restrict the coverage of the former phrase more than that of
the latter, and that there is also a tendency to increase the
scope of coverage of the latter phrase until it approximates
that of the phrase, "affecting commerce," although the Court
still asserts that the coverage of neither phrase is that broad.
From a review of the cases involving the determination
of overtime and compensable working time, it seems possible
that the Court has been seeking a formula where no exact
formula is available, in order to meet the variations of the
infinite number of fact situations, and that it has attempted
an administrative role which might better be left to'the fact
finding powers of lower courts, to the recommendations of
the Administrator based upon increasingly greater experience,
or to collective bargaining between the employer and employee.
It is obvious that the employer and employee could not con-
tract that the employee should not be paid for what is con-
cededly working time, because that would be contracting in
violation of the Act. However, there are innumerable acts of
employees which are only work for which they are entitled
to compensation because the Court so holds. Where the parties
themselves have agreed on the definition of work in these
situations where the definition is one in which judgments may
differ, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the definition
be left to genuine collective bargaining. The avowed purpose
of the Act is to spread employment. Some of the decisions
establishing liability for compensable time and overtime seem
to have slight connection with that purpose. The popular
conception of the implications of the so-called "portal to
portal" cases is probably greatly exaggerated. It is doubtful
that the asserted liability of employers in this connection is
as great as has been predicted, when fully considering the
decisions under which the claims are made. It must be re-
membered that the Court has been forced into an adminis-
trative role because the Congress gave the Administrator only
advisory powers to suggest to employers what his best judg-
ment is concerning how the Court will interpret the Act. Thus
the burden of administration was placed upon the Court by
the Act itself. The Court seems to be groping for reasonable
formulae for orderly societal evolution within the framework
of legislation and established jurisprudence, but without hav-
ing fully mastered the dialectic of change.
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